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Every vision of history functions as a speciﬁc lens or optic that a theorist employs to illuminate some facet of human
reality. Each perspective is both enabling, allowing a strongly
focused study, and limiting, preventing consideration of other
perspectives.¹
1. Steven Best, The Politics of Historical Vision: Marx, Foucault, Habermas (New
York: Guilford, 1995), 255.
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Mormon: Explorations in Critical Methodology, ed. Brent Lee Metcalfe, 395–444. Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1993. xiv + 446
pages. $26.95.
Review of Edwin Firmage Jr. “Historical Criticism and the Book of
Mormon: A Personal Encounter.” In American Apocrypha: Essays
on the Book of Mormon, ed. Dan Vogel and Brent Lee Metcalfe, 1–16.
Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002. xvii + 369 pages. $21.95.
Review of Susan Staker. “Secret Things, Hidden Things: The Seer
Story in the Imaginative Economy of Joseph Smith.” In American
Apocrypha: Essays on the Book of Mormon, ed. Dan Vogel and Brent
Lee Metcalfe, 235–74. Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002. xvii +
369 pages. $21.95.
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One of the things one learns from the study of history is
that such study is never innocent, ideologically or otherwise.²

B

illy Collins, former U.S. Poet Laureate, writes a wonderful poem
about “The History Teacher.”³ Not wanting to disturb the tender
sensibilities of his students who after school are assaulting and manhandling each other, he softens the impact of the hard lessons of history. Among other topics, the historian teaches his students that “the
Ice Age was really just / the Chilly Age,” a time cold enough to require
sweaters. The Spanish Inquisition was a period when people asked
searching questions of each other about Spanish culture, such as the
distance to Madrid and the term attached to hats worn by matadors.
For all his students know, the Enola Gay dropped a single microscopic
atom on Hiroshima, and in the Boer War soldiers told each other digressive narratives intending to make the other side nod oﬀ. Though
I desire to tell comforting tales to those learning Mormon history, I’ll
have to tell a postmodern story instead: the old modern ways of organizing history with the belief that the historian can narrate the past
with objectivity, free of all bias and ideology, is equivalent to telling
children that the “War of the Roses took place in a garden.”
Bryan Appleyard laments that scientists take for granted a particular epistemology without even being aware that the epistemology ﬁlters
evidence (dismissing contrary evidence) and favors particular ideologies. When they speak to each other, they can take for granted that the
ideology and epistemology are widely shared by other scientists. When
speaking to a broader public, “they tend to reveal a startling philosophical naïveté.”⁴ Historians, since the end of the nineteenth century, have
attempted to model their discipline on the sciences; unfortunately, what
they mimicked was this shortcoming in scientiﬁc work. That attempt to
make history scientiﬁc has proven a failure, and in the last three decades

2. Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 82.
3. Billy Collins, “The History Teacher,” in Sailing Alone around the Room: New and
Selected Poems (New York: Random House, 2001), 38.
4. Bryan Appleyard, Understanding the Present: Science and the Soul of Modern
Man (New York: Doubleday, 1992), xv.
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historiography has instead emphasized that history is more like literature than science. The model of science favored by these scientistic historians (objective, value-free, free of all ideology and presuppositions)
has largely fallen into disrepute even within the disciplines and philosophy of science. We should not be too surprised if historians lag behind
these theoretical developments in science and sophisticated historiography; little more should we be surprised if amateur or self-appointed
historians adopt the dominant-but-mistaken ethos of the discipline. We
should not be surprised if professional and amateur historians also display a naïveté about textual analysis and understanding the past.
Dan Vogel and Brent Metcalfe have collected a group of essays
about the Book of Mormon called American Apocrypha: Essays on the
Book of Mormon. Published by Signature Books, this collection continues an ideological project from earlier books in Signature Book’s
Essays on Mormonism Series (see p. ii);⁵ this project denies the essential historical claims of Latter-day Saint foundational events, mostly
the historical nature of the Book of Mormon and ﬁrst vision. While
the editors of these volumes may believe the quaint notion that they
have no ideology but are just doing impartial, unbiased, objective history, readers ought to realize that this is a myth.
Although the other essays in this volume deserve attention to
both their weaknesses and strengths, I will narrow my focus to Edwin
Firmage’s “Historical Criticism and the Book of Mormon: A Personal
Encounter” and Susan Staker’s “Secret Things, Hidden Things: The
Seer Story in the Imaginative Economy of Joseph Smith.” These essays
posit that when Joseph Smith dictated what they consider his novel or
scripture, he encountered a crisis when Martin Harris lost the ﬁrst 116
pages of the manuscript. When he resumed, Joseph Smith began not
with those parts of the book placed ﬁrst in the published volume and
5. The Essays on Mormonism Series includes Gary J. Bergera, ed., Line upon Line:
Essays on Mormon Doctrine (1989); Dan Vogel, ed., The Word of God: Essays on Mormon
Scripture (1990); D. Michael Quinn, ed., The New Mormon History: Revisionist Essays
on the Past (1992); and Bryan Waterman, ed., The Prophet Puzzle: Interpretive Essays on
Joseph Smith (1999). Another book in that series, George D. Smith, ed., Faithful History:
Essays on Writing Mormon History (1992), collects essays from a couple of diﬀerent ideological perspectives.
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chronologically ﬁrst in the narrative (1 and 2 Nephi), but with Mosiah
through Moroni, composing the Nephi material last. Since this theory
has elsewhere been defended by Brent Metcalfe, one of the editors of this
volume, I will also address one of his essays in an earlier publication.⁶
I intend my approach to be contrapuntal; I will contrast the innocence of these writers about their own ideology with a recent book to
underline how an adequate approach might develop, even among Book
of Mormon critics who deny its historical claims. Huston Smith, in
Why Religion Matters, decries the dominance of positivism (he usually
uses the term scientism) in religious studies.⁷

Ideology and Worldview
We have made some progress over the past decade. Book of Mormon revisionists now rarely claim that they are merely doing objective
historical research free of all bias, preconception, and ideology. These
claims were common among Mormon revisionists just ten years ago.
This positivism that claimed to free itself of all ideology became the
dominant assumption of the modern university when it adopted the
German disciplinary model. German universities “were positivistic to
the core, and (because they have retained their place as the model for
the American university) it is important to understand the militant
secularism that is built into the word positivism.”⁸ Positivists deliberately set out to debunk religion, so with the collapse of the positivist project in the past forty years, some examination of the debunking itself needs to be undertaken. With religious studies and history
still dominated by positivism at the level of the working historian, we
should expect those who aspire to be called historians to also adopt
the positivistic ethos.
6. Brent Lee Metcalfe, “The Priority of Mosiah: A Prelude to Book of Mormon Exegesis,” in New Approaches to the Book of Mormon: Explorations in Critical Methodology,
ed. Brent Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1993), 395–444.
7. Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of
Disbelief (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
8. Ibid., 97.
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Positivism commonly provides the worldview of those who deny
the Book of Mormon historical status; this does not mean that all such
historians fall under the category of revisionists, but this view is the
dominant strain of history that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, just
when positivism was being challenged in philosophy, literary criticism,
and historiography. But “worldviews tend to pass unnoticed,”⁹ so before examining the textual claims of the Mosiah-ﬁrst proponents, we
must bring their worldview into focus. Positivism is just one version
of modernity. Built into the modern worldview is what Huston Smith
calls scientism, with two corollaries: (1) the scientiﬁc method is the
only valid way to acquire knowledge, and (2) what science examines
(material reality) is the fundamental reality. (These are parodies of
science, so scientism as an ideology is not to be confused with science.)
“These two corollaries are seldom voiced, for once they are brought to
attention it is not diﬃcult to see that they are arbitrary. Unsupported
by facts, they are at best philosophical assumptions and at worst only
opinions.”¹⁰ These assumptions are metaphysical presuppositions
rather than being based on evidence (for they must be assumed before
the researcher can deﬁne what counts as evidence). So consider the
irony that the materialist claims only to deal with a material reality,
precluding all supernaturalism, while making a metaphysical declaration. If we assume that material reality is the only reality, we have already excluded religious claims based on divine revelation. The result
is that positivists decide by ﬁat that any supernatural assertions are
false. This is the circumstance that Smith lays out as a condemnation
of today’s university—that its professors too often begin with the assumption that religion is false.
This habit of assuming that religion is untrue by subscribing to
materialism is common in our universities, and we might also expect
it of dilettantes who lack the credentials that academic degrees and
teaching positions bestow:
9. Ibid., 48.
10. Ibid., 60.
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Such antireligion in American higher education was
launched in full force in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
by conﬁdent apostles of secularization who sought to popularize the doctrines of positivism, epistemological foundationalism, and scientiﬁc objectivity. Of course, each of these
perspectives has been thoroughly dissected for decades now
by all manner of philosophers, historians, theologians, and
social theorists. The corpse of logical positivism is badly decomposed, but its ghost still haunts the halls and classrooms
of the academy.¹¹
Christian Smith explains this persistent antireligious attitude by referring to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which “involves persistent and deeply internalized mental schemes that correspond to and
reinforce particular social conditions, and that operate prereﬂectively
through human actors.”¹² So why are our universities so habitually
and uncritically antireligious? Because so many of their citizens adhere to an unreﬂective positivism and materialism “that is no less a
matter of faith than is theism.”¹³
Although explicit assertions that the researcher can obtain objectivity are seldom made now by Mormon revisionists, you might
expect that positivism’s adherents might make other claims to being
ideology-free. As a matter of deeply ingrained training, you might also
expect this positivism to be coupled with an antireligious approach by
those who claim the mantle of scholarship. So when the editors of
American Apocrypha make a sharp distinction between what they do
and what believers in the Book of Mormon do because the latter are
“apologists” for an ideology but the former are not, they have made a
positivist assertion; by asserting that only people who disagree with
them are defenders of an ideology, the editors make the familiar positivist claims from the ﬂip side of the coin. Vogel and Metcalfe refer six
times in the introduction to those who disagree with them by variants
11. Christian Smith, “Force of Habit: Hostility and Condescension toward Religion
in the University,” Books and Culture 8/5 (2002): 20.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 21.

Metcalfe, Firmage, Staker, Mosiah-First Theories (Goff) • 17

of the words apologist or defender. This vocabulary assumes that it is
possible not to be an apologist for an ideology. This remnant of positivism still dominates the antireligious fervor in institutions of higher
education. But, as Huston Smith has pointed out, worldviews tend to
be taken for granted.¹⁴ The kind of hermeneutical, philosophical, and
methodological analysis required to go beyond the still-dominant cultural positivism is often too complex to be taught to undergraduates.
Even graduate programs often do not train students in postpositivistic approaches. The instructors in hermeneutical and methodological
courses tend to mirror now-outdated conceptual schemes. But some
graduate students stand a chance of being awakened from their culturally induced positivist slumbers because they can detour around
their positivistic professors by reading broadly. Those without graduate training in the philosophy of their disciplines stand little chance of
moving beyond positivism.
Vogel and Metcalfe also assert that Book of Mormon “apologists”
have advanced ad hoc arguments. They are referring speciﬁcally to
discussions of Book of Mormon geography. “Rather than accept negative evidence,” these critics claim, “apologists often invent ad hoc hypotheses to protect and maintain a crumbling central hypothesis. This
tactic violates what is called the principle of parsimony, or Occam’s
Razor, which posits that the best hypothesis is the simplest or the one
that makes the fewest assumptions” (p. ix; all internal references are to
American Apocrypha). Vogel and Metcalfe are still caught in a positivistic historiographical theory, for they do not seem to understand the
role of worldviews and how these generalizations authorize or invalidate evidence and theories. If I adhere to a worldview that permits supernatural intervention and you are an apologist for one that denies
such actions, my arguments are always going to feel ad hoc to you. But
then, your arguments are going to sound ad hoc to me also. Vogel and
Metcalfe have not considered the possibility that what we have here is
a clash of worldviews rather than a clash of evidence; the Mosiah-ﬁrst
theories seem ad hoc to me because they deal with the Book of Mormon
14. H. Smith, Why Religion Matters, 48.
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without accepting its complexity. Only one Book of Mormon revisionist has even recognized that Book of Mormon complexity is a problem
revisionists must engage.¹⁵ His book is actually a rebuke to the writers
of this volume, who lack the literary critical skills to analyze the Book
of Mormon with the level of subtlety it deserves. The problem is that
worldviews are metaphysical constructs that deﬁne what counts as valid
support for a position.
Positivism is also manifest by one of the editors of American Apocrypha when he consistently refers to those “Mormon apologists” who
disagree with his position¹⁶ as if they are the only ones involved in the
controversy who are apologists. One of Vogel’s contributions in this
book begins with the word apologists¹⁷ and consistently accuses opponents of being defenders. It does not occur to Vogel that he is himself an
apologist for an ideology that rests on positivism, that being an apologist for an ideology is an inescapable condition. A similar positivistic
claim made by Vogel is that people who disagree with him use rhetoric,
while he just presents the facts. For those who believe that there were
gold plates, physical plates, for the Book of Mormon witnesses to see
and touch, Vogel says “this argument is designed more to persuade than
to enlighten.”¹⁸ But Vogel’s argument seems designed the same way. He
believes he can separate the persuasive part of an argument from its
evidentiary value. Yet Vogel’s assertion itself is rhetorical: in his own
words, it is “designed more to persuade than to enlighten.” Only a positivist could believe in the false binary opposition that separates rhetoric
from logic in this way. “Whereas positivist forms of philosophy and science adhere to the ‘objectivist’ belief in pure knowledge untainted by
15. Mark Thomas, Digging in Cumorah: Reclaiming Book of Mormon Narratives (Salt
Lake City: Signature Books, 1999), admits that the Book of Mormon is sophisticated but
makes only halting steps to examine that erudite and elusive quality.
16. Dan Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry: A Rejoinder to Critics of the Anti-Masonic
Thesis,” in American Apocrypha: Essays on the Book of Mormon, ed. Dan Vogel and Brent
Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002), 275–320; see especially his introduction and conclusion. All of Brent Metcalfe’s writing uses the same terminology.
17. Dan Vogel, “The Validity of the Witnesses’ Testimonies,” in American Apocrypha, 79.
18. Ibid.
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theoretical presuppositions or external motivations and interests,
. . . the construction of knowledge is indissociable from various human
interests that serve as motives for action.”¹⁹ Vogel seems unaware of his
argument’s rhetorical grounding, particularly of the rhetoric of positivism to which he appeals. “‘Historical vacuums’ are frequently used for
sweeping condemnations of certain forms of inquiry; I have never seen
any historians attacked for working in a ‘rhetorical vacuum.’”²⁰ To be
critical in historiography today, one must be aware of one’s own ideological and rhetorical commitments. Jörn Rüsen notes in an interview
that historians usually attempt to avoid any discussion of their own
rhetoric because they adhere to a lingering positivism:
When traditional historians hear the word “rhetoric”
they become upset. Why? Because they think rhetoric is the
contrary of academic rationality; accepting rhetoric means
the contrary of being a good scholar. A good scholar means:
to follow methodological rules of research, to go to the archives, and to make a good, empirically based interpretation
of what happened in the past. Rhetoric is something diﬀerent.
It is against reason, it is against rationality; it is just playing
around with words. This common opinion of professional
historians is completely wrong.²¹
The literature on historiography now emphasizes that the ideology
and rhetoric of the historian are probably the most important inﬂuences in historical interpretations, often being more inﬂuential than
any archival or secondary source evidence. If this is true, then those
who publish with a press such as Signature Books must recognize that
they have an ideology, that their ideology is a dominant inﬂuence in
their writing, and that they select through their ideology which evidence they will see as important or unimportant.
19. Best, Politics of Historical Vision, 153.
20. Hans Kellner, Historical Language and Historical Representation: Getting the
Story Crooked (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 122.
21. Ewa Domańska, Encounters: Philosophy of History after Postmodernism (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 151.
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Vogel’s goal in his essay about Book of Mormon witnesses is to
deny any material or naturalistic witness of plates or angels. Following
positivists who believe an event is valid only if it can be demonstrated
empirically, he argues:
Despite the use of naturalistic language in the Testimony
of Three Witnesses—particularly the emphasis on seeing the
plates with their “eyes” as well as the failure to mention the
angel’s glory—subsequent statements by Harris and Whitmer
point to the visionary aspects of their experience. In other
words, the event was internal and subjective and in the fullest
sense a vision.²²
While in the very act of accusing Joseph Smith of charlatanry, Vogel conﬂates visions with hallucinations to make the straightforward assertion
that visionary experiences do not amount to historical evidence: “The
real question is not the trustworthiness of the witnesses but whether
testimony resulting from visions or hallucinations is reliable.”²³ Vogel
begins by implying that rhetoric designed to persuade does not have the
same force of knowledge as his more valid logic. He ends his essay by
asserting that only naturalistic, materialistic experience makes for valid
historical evidence. He uses what Best calls a “positivistic rhetoric,”²⁴
while claiming that only his opponents engage in rhetoric. “Good historiography requires hermeneutical sensitivity, empathetic and imaginative reconstruction, and reﬂexive methodological sophistication,”²⁵
none of which this collection of essays demonstrates.
I have elsewhere pointed out the positivistic assumptions in Brent
Metcalfe’s work.²⁶ Vogel, similar to Metcalfe, is not self-critical and
consequently ends up an uncritical apologist for positivism. Again,
22. Vogel, “Validity of the Witnesses’ Testimonies,” 86. See page 97 for a similar
statement regarding the Testimony of Eight Witnesses.
23. Ibid., 108.
24. Best, Politics of Historical Vision, 237.
25. Ibid.
26. See Alan Goﬀ, “Historical Narrative, Literary Narrative,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 5/1 (1996): 50–102; and Alan Goﬀ, “Uncritical Theory and Thin Description:
The Resistance to History,” Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 7/1 (1995): 170–207.
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positivism is that worldview that claims it has no worldview, that adheres to a naïve realism which assumes that it reveals the world exactly as it is, free of ideology and rhetoric.
The deeper fact, however, is that to have or not have a
worldview is not an option, for peripheral vision always conditions what we are attending to focally, and in conceptual
“seeing” the periphery has no cutoﬀ. The only choice we have
is to be consciously aware of our worldviews and criticize
them where they need criticizing, or let them work on us unnoticed and acquiesce to living unexamined lives.²⁷
Because positivism is that ideology prohibiting self-criticism, Vogel
and Metcalfe are not aware that they constitute the evidence from
within a positivistic worldview while denying the validity of competing worldviews.
The positivist worldview denies the supernatural. That denial is
not based on evidence but on presuppositions. Modernity presupposes
that material reality is all there is. Religious belief requires that reality
not be exhausted by a naïve materialism. But to claim that materialism is adequate to explain all of reality is to invoke a metaphysics.²⁸
We must recognize that modernity is being contradictory here, for to
claim that materialism is all there is goes beyond material claims; it is
not itself empirically veriﬁable.
What is and is not seen to be scientism is itself metaphysically controlled, for if one believes that the scientiﬁc worldview is
true, the two appendages to it that turn it into scientism are not
seen to be opinions. (I remind the reader that the appendages are,
ﬁrst, that science is our best window onto the world and, second,
that matter is the foundation of everything that exists.) They
present themselves as facts. That they are not provable does not
count against them, because they are taken to be self-evident—as
plainly so as the proverbial hand before one’s face.²⁹
27. H. Smith, Why Religion Matters, 21.
28. Ibid., 42.
29. Ibid., 64.
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Because worldviews are large-scale conceptual structures that shape
and misshape what we permit as evidence for particular theories,
“what is taken to be self-evident depends on one’s worldview, and disputes among worldviews are . . . unresolvable.”³⁰
This modern worldview, of which positivism is just one subset,
is imperialistic; it insists it is the only valid approach to truth.³¹ Science, social science, religious studies, biblical criticism, history—all
disciplines have accepted the modern assertion that religious claims
are only metaphorical, out of the realm of true knowledge which they
themselves deliver. In other words, “the modern university is not agnostic toward religion; it is actively hostile to it.”³² Since the contributors to American Apocrypha are uncritical apologists for that version
of modernity called positivism, its readers must be aware of that larger
historical background even if its editors are not.

Mosiah-First Theories
When I ﬁrst read Brent Metcalfe’s essay positing the Mosiah-ﬁrst
theory, I was a bit puzzled by its lack of focus. I did not recognize
its ideological implication. Several textual relationships are relevant
in the Book of Mormon; I have elsewhere argued that allusions from
the Book of Mormon to the Pentateuch and the work of the Deuteronomist (Joshua through 2 Kings) are particularly important.³³ Other
allusions from one or another Book of Mormon passage to earlier
passages deserve careful attention. These three attempts to support a
Mosiah-ﬁrst theory bring ideological presuppositions. Firmage notes
that “questions about the Book of Mormon’s origins” cannot yet be
answered, but the uncertainty does not “diminish the certainty of
[the] conclusion that the Book of Mormon is a modern text” (p. 15).
If you sneak in a hidden ideological assumption that Joseph Smith
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 69.
32. Ibid., 96.
33. Alan Goﬀ, “Scratching the Surface of Book of Mormon Narrative,” FARMS Review of Books 12/2 (2000): 51–82.
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authored a thinly veiled autobiographical novel, it is hardly surprising
that your conclusion will be that the scripture is a modern novel. Literary critics have long used tools of textual analysis such as allusion,
transumption, intertextuality, and the like to analyze textual relationships. Rather than employ any of these sophisticated tools, Metcalfe,
Firmage, and Staker use an ad hoc Mosiah-ﬁrst theory as a shortcut to
avoid the complex textual analysis the text requires.
But, as Metcalfe notes, belief in the Book of Mormon as an ancient
text can survive the Mosiah-ﬁrst hypothesis. Some believers who have
considered the question of translation sequence do believe in Mosiahﬁrst (John Welch, Royal Skousen, and Dan Peterson included, according to Metcalfe).³⁴ If you believe in the Book of Mormon, then you
believe there were plates from which Joseph Smith translated. Therefore, it does not matter if the dictation started from Mosiah or Nephi,
because the book is grounded in those physical records. But Metcalfe
assumes that “intrinsically woven into the Book of Mormon’s fabric
are not only remnants of the peculiar dictation sequence but threads
of authorship. The composite of those elements explored in this essay point to Smith as the narrative’s chief designer.”³⁵ If you take for
granted that the plates did not exist but that Joseph Smith fabricated a
novel out of his own mind and experiences, then the Mosiah-ﬁrst theory
means that you can no longer believe in the book as an authentic ancient record. The Mosiah-ﬁrst presupposition is not, in itself, doing
the ideological work for these three writers; it is the assumption that
Joseph Smith is the work’s novelist. This argument is obviously circular. Does this fact undercut it? Metcalfe, Firmage, and Staker never
confess that they have not argued for their most crucial assumption:
there were no gold plates. Perhaps, like Sterling McMurrin, these writers would best state more explicitly their ideological assumption that
angels do not deliver books to boys.³⁶
34. Metcalfe, “Priority of Mosiah,” 396–99. John Welch and Tim Rathbone endorse
the Mosiah-ﬁrst theory in the FARMS Update collected in Reexploring the Book of
Mormon: A Decade of New Research, ed. John W. Welch (Provo, UT: Deseret Book and
FARMS, 1992), 3.
35. Metcalfe, “Priority of Mosiah,” 433.
36. Blake Ostler, “An Interview with Sterling M. McMurrin,” Dialogue 17/1 (1984): 25.
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Metcalfe, Firmage, and Staker have diﬀerent emphases, but they
share a common ideological framework. Metcalfe, taking for granted
an unargued evolutionary assumption that more complex forms must
be chronologically later than what he considers “primitive” forms,
grants the following:
Occasionally the middle section of the book (Mosiah and
Alma) displays concepts which are less well developed than in
the initial section (1 Nephi–Omni). These earlier portions are
more congruent with later sections. It is diﬃcult to explain
the more primitive elements in Mosiah and Alma unless one
assumes that Mosiah was the ﬁrst installment in the Book of
Mormon narrative.³⁷
This chronology is crucial for all three of these writers. They use
versions of this theory to establish parallel chronologies between Book
of Mormon events and episodes in Joseph Smith’s life. Besides making assumptions about textual relationships, these authors assume
primitive ideas about the relationship between literature and reality.
These same assumptions appear when journalists interview novelists
and persistently ask how much of the narrative is autobiographical. If
Smith wrote the Book of Mormon as a novel, they cannot conceive of
the possibility that he just made the material up using his own imagination. They fall into what Mark Thomas sees as a trap: “almost all
serious Mormon scholarship on the book attempts to reconstruct its
historical origins, making little or no eﬀort at interpretation.”³⁸ While
Thomas agrees with these revisionists that the scripture is a modern
work of ﬁction, he still condemns this ﬁxation on proving origins
as hindering a sophisticated literary understanding of the text. The
ideological assumption that Joseph Smith wrote the book as a novel
is almost always coupled with superﬁcial textual analysis. Such an assumption depends on a dubious theory of ﬁction while at the same
time insisting on the ﬁctional status of the book: Joseph Smith made
37. Metcalfe, “Priority of Mosiah,” 415–16.
38. Thomas, Digging in Cumorah, viii.
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the narrative up but couldn’t actually do so except as he expressed and
transformed his own autobiography.
Because Susan Staker articulates more speciﬁcally than the other
two writers the parallels between Book of Mormon narrative and
Joseph Smith’s life, her essay most precisely lays out the ideological
assumption built into this project. “Thus the threshold story of Mormonism, the entrance to surviving portions of the Book of Mormon,
is about a man whose plot line mirrors in crucial ways that of the
nineteenth-century man with the seer stone who dictated the story”
(pp. 235–36).
The Mosiah-ﬁrst theory in the hands of these revisionists depends
on a particular historical development of the Book of Mormon text.
After the loss of the 116 pages, Joseph Smith started over at Mosiah.
Mosiah, then, has the most primitive and least developed ideas and
knowledge about Christ’s mission and about doctrine. First and 2 Nephi, being last, are the most complex and developed. This theory also
requires that Joseph Smith not know how the end of the story (1 and
2 Nephi) is going to develop when he dictated Mosiah, Alma, Mormon, and similar material:
It is not diﬃcult to explain why prophecies of Jesus in Mosiah
and Alma 1–16 evidence no awareness of Nephi’s prophecies
of Jesus’ American ministry. The explanation is simply that
during the initial stages of the new 1829 translation (Mosiah
to Alma 16), Joseph Smith himself had not yet conceived the
notion of Christ’s visit to America. The ignorance of Nephi’s
prophecies manifested by the characters in Mosiah and Alma
1–16 reﬂects the fact that Smith, the creator-translator, did
not yet himself know the turn his narrative was to take. Nephi’s unambiguous prophecies reﬂect the fact that they were
translated, or as I would now prefer to say, composed, after
the events they claimed to foretell. (Firmage, pp. 6–7)
I will examine the question of whether the individuals in Alma, Mosiah, Helaman, and 3 Nephi are not familiar with the material in 1 and
2 Nephi because “1 Nephi–Words of Mormon proves to be an epilogue
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to the Book of Mormon proper not only in terms of order of composition but also in terms of subject matter” (p. 9).
Staker’s commitment to this theory depends a good deal on the
work of Firmage and Metcalfe. Her essay contains comments on typology or type-scenes and also some discussion of narrative voice.
Her treatment would beneﬁt from a reading in narrative and literary
theory of what critics call focalization. Staker shows no awareness of
the literary tools and concepts that could deepen her reading of the
text. Nor does she show awareness that quite a few readers have discussed such notions as exodus and Moses typology in the Book of
Mormon and its similarity to biblical typology.
Staker’s position, like that of Firmage and Metcalfe, depends more
on the presupposition that Joseph Smith was the author of a work of
autobiographical ﬁction than it does on the Mosiah-ﬁrst thesis. Having smuggled in that assumption, Staker constructs timelines for both
Book of Mormon development and Joseph Smith’s biography that are
mutually dependent. Her chronology is based more on ideology than
on anything else.
Already, the March and April revelations demonstrate the
complicated ways the Book of Mormon narrative and Smith’s
own world would mirror and interact over the course of the
spring and summer. Ultimately, the complicated logic of the
seer stories can be traced only when the dictation plot for the
spring and summer of 1829 is expanded to include the chronology of Smith’s work on both the Book of Mormon and its
environing revelations. Indeed, the energy that drives and
structures the complex seer narratives in both the ancient and
modern texts seems derived as much from the problems facing Smith in 1829 as by problems within the Book of Mormon
world. (p. 248)
These are grand claims. She stakes everything on a chronology
that places Book of Mormon events alongside events in upstate New
York and Harmony, Pennsylvania. For example, in April 1829 Staker
claims that a revelation about Oliver Cowdery’s possible translation
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of records included remarks about “other hidden records awaiting
translation. Arguably, this glimpse into Smith’s future mimes Mosiah’s story, which includes the discovery of several new records. . . .
Strikingly, Smith enacts this same sub-plot within the frame of his
own story during the time he is dictating Mosiah” (p. 250). Mosiah’s
recovery of actual records is not placed next to Joseph Smith’s recovery of actual records, for Joseph Smith had possessed the gold plates
for many months before this episode. The parallel does not seem
striking to me. (Staker often refers to her parallels as “striking.”) Any
deviation in the Mosiah-ﬁrst theory of composition or in the Joseph
Smith chronology is going to spell trouble, for it will throw oﬀ her
temporal parallels.
If readers were to ask these critics to make their ideological presuppositions explicit, they would ﬁnd not only the positivistic and
similar modern assumptions (such as unstated evolutionary models)
at work but also the idea that Joseph Smith had no knowledge of the
material later to emerge in 1 and 2 Nephi when he invented Mosiah–
Moroni. At least some novelists must have the ending in mind from
the very start of the writing process, but these three writers posit the
other type of novelist, the kind who goes wherever the narrative leads
with no master plan. I think we can examine this thesis, crucial to all
three writers, to see if applies to the Mosiah-ﬁrst theory of writing the
Book of Mormon.

Allusion and Quotation Referring to 1 and 2 Nephi
Is it plausible to believe that 1 and 2 Nephi were composed last
and not believe in those plates? Looking at passages that refer back to
those ﬁrst two books might illuminate this question.
The Promise of Prosperity in the Land
A promise ﬁrst turns up in the Book of Mormon in 1 Nephi 2:20–
21: “Inasmuch as ye shall keep my commandments, ye shall prosper
and shall be led to a land of promise. . . . And inasmuch as thy brethren shall rebel against thee, they shall be cut oﬀ from the presence of
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the Lord.” This promise was, apparently, also recorded in the earlier
record of Lehi, for the patriarch notes that he obtained the promise
for his descendents (2 Nephi 1:9; in Alma 9:13–14, Alma also refers
to the promise as originating with Lehi). This promise is alluded to or
quoted more than forty times in the Book of Mormon. In a Mosiahﬁrst Book of Mormon, it would ﬁrst make its appearance in Mosiah
1:7, 17. Here Benjamin repeats the covenant by speciﬁcally telling his
sons that they are “promises which the Lord made to our fathers”
(Mosiah 1:7). The Mosiah-ﬁrst revisionist might speculate that these
promises really point back to the lost book of Lehi rather than to 1 and
2 Nephi. But this entire chapter shows fairly detailed knowledge of the
initial rift between the Nephites and the Lamanites (a separation, by
the way, that opened after Lehi’s death and presumably after Lehi’s
record ended), the records and other symbols acquired from Laban,
and the Liahona. If Joseph Smith is just winging it when he later composes the Nephi books, he will have to incorporate a lot of speciﬁc
references. The real violence this theory does to the text is that it requires Smith to remember hundreds of prior compositions to “allude”
back to a story that has not yet been written. If there really had been
gold plates, this Mosiah-ﬁrst theory would pose no diﬃculty, because
those plates provide a way to overcome this problem. But since Staker,
Metcalfe, and Firmage presume a priori that the plates did not exist,
they must have some unnecessarily complicated theory to account for
such “allusions” and “quotations.” I would call that an ad hoc theory.
This covenant promise is alluded to or cited ten times in the book
of Mosiah. It comes up prominently again when Alma advises his son
Helaman in Alma 36–38. Two of these citations in chapter 36 envelop
a reference to the Lehite exodus from 1 Nephi. Eleven citations of this
promise appear in the book of Alma and four in Helaman. One would
expect this promise to be more primitive in the earlier parts of the
Mosiah-ﬁrst Book of Mormon. Eleven passages with the promise are
in 1 and 2 Nephi, though I do not ﬁnd more complex development in
those passages. The bridge books (Jacob–Words of Mormon) contain
the promise twice (Jarom 1:9 and Omni 1:6). The more intuitive, simpler solution to textual relationships among these citations would cite
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a promise ﬁrst made in the text to Lehi or Nephi. To have the promise
come ﬁrst to Mosiah requires some additional explanation.
The Language of the Fathers
When King Benjamin is ready to pass his kingship and records to
the next generation, he calls his sons together. He says of the plates of
brass, “Were it not possible that our father, Lehi, could have remembered all these things, to have taught them to his children, except it
were for the help of these plates . . .” (Mosiah 1:4), yet this is precisely
what these Mosiah-ﬁrst revisionists insist Joseph Smith did. He must
remember all these hundreds (or perhaps even thousands) of allusions
and then ﬁnally include them in 1 and 2 Nephi; the notion of intertextuality challenges the older notion of allusion in that it does not care
about lines of ﬁliation, that is, which passage came ﬁrst. These revisionists are postmodern without knowing it, for they turn the notion
of allusion on its head, having allusions come chronologically before
the original passage, the antitype before the prototype, the reference
before the initial iteration.
In this passage from the Book of Mormon, Benjamin speciﬁcally
names the source—Lehi: “for he having been taught in the language of
the Egyptians therefore he could read these engravings” (Mosiah 1:4).
This takes us back to Mosiah 1:2, for Benjamin had taught his sons “in
all the language of his fathers, that thereby they might become men of
understanding; and that they might know concerning the prophecies
which had been spoken by the mouths of their fathers.” It is true that
these revisionists might say that these passages allude back not to a
nonexistent 1 Nephi, but to the recently lost book of Lehi. Nevertheless, Joseph Smith would have to refer back to a text he does not have
and would still have to be relying for these manifold allusions on his
own memory; having a set of plates alleviates this problem because it
would then not place the burden of allusive memory on Joseph Smith
but on Mormon or some other writer/editor. Some adequate explanation will have to be proﬀered about how Smith was able to keep all
these allusions straight when it came to composing the Nephi books.
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Benjamin is here alluding to 1 Nephi 1:2. Mormon is going to allude to this passage when his turn comes: “we have written this record
according to our knowledge, in the characters which are called among
us the reformed Egyptian” (Mormon 9:32). This is not Mormon’s only
allusion to this passage from Nephi. “I began,” he also claims, “to be
learned somewhat after the manner of the learning of my people”
(Mormon 1:2). And Mormon is not the only author to allude to this
passage from Nephi. Enos states that he also was taught by his father,
“knowing my father that he was a just man—for he taught me in his
language, and also in the nurture and admonition of the Lord” (Enos
1:1). There from the very end of the Mosiah-ﬁrst Book of Mormon, we
go to the ﬁrst of the same volume. Zeniﬀ alludes to the same passage
when he says, “I, Zeniﬀ, having been taught in all the language of the
Nephites” (Mosiah 9:1).
The revisionist could claim that these passages do not really allude to 1 Nephi 1 but to Mosiah 1. But in Mosiah 1 the text already
refers back to “the prophecies which had been spoken by the mouths
of their fathers” (Mosiah 1:2); the very ﬁrst two verses in the Mosiahﬁrst Book of Mormon (dictated, according to this theory, on 7 April
1829) already refer to the passage from 1 Nephi (dictated about June
1829). These allusions become a diﬃcult problem if you assume there
were no plates to translate from.
Tree of Life Allusions
The earlier writers in the Mosiah-ﬁrst Book of Mormon seem to
know quite a bit about the two visions of the tree of life from 1 Nephi.
There are many allusions to the tree of life material later in the scripture. For example, Alma’s extended metaphor of planting the seed of
faith ends by comparing the fully grown seed to the tree of life (Alma
32:40; see also 32:41 and 33:23). Alma refers to the fruit as “most precious, which is sweet above all that is sweet, and which is white above
all that is white, yea, and pure above all that is pure” (Alma 32:42). This
alludes to either Lehi’s description of the fruit (1 Nephi 8:11) or Nephi’s
(1 Nephi 11:8). For these tree of life allusions, no comparable passage
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exists in the early part of the Mosiah-ﬁrst text to be the original. The
only original text must be from 1 Nephi (or the lost book of Lehi).
Lamoni’s conversion under Ammon’s guidance is framed with vocabulary from the tree of life visions (Alma 19:6). Similarly, the book
of Helaman refers to “laying hold upon the word of God” (Helaman
3:29), which is wording from 1 Nephi 8:24 or 1 Nephi 15:24. Such speciﬁc knowledge of passages not yet written poses a problem for the
idea that Joseph Smith composed the Book of Mormon as Firmage,
Staker, and Metcalfe want us to believe.
Tree of life allusions are so common throughout the Book of Mormon that to posit an extensive array of allusions written before the allegory itself complicates this theory beyond what its ideological foundation will bear. Let me provide just one more example. When Alma
the Younger preaches to the Nephites, he calls them to repentance by
asking a whole series of questions about their spiritual state. He then
frames their return to God in a trope from Nephi and Lehi’s records:
“Yea, he saith: Come unto me and ye shall partake of the fruit of the
tree of life; yea, ye shall eat and drink of the bread and the waters of
life freely” (Alma 5:34). He closes his speech to the people at Zarahemla with a similar ﬁgure of speech: “Come and be baptized unto
repentance, that ye also may be partakers of the fruit of the tree of life”
(Alma 5:62). It seems overly complicated to posit that a whole web of
allusions to these tree of life images is created ﬁrst and then later the
coherent story that ties them all together (the word of God is a doubleedged blade as it cuts both ways).
Miscellaneous Allusions to 1 and 2 Nephi
After breaking with his brothers, Nephi organizes his people and
achieves a level of righteousness they were not able to attain before
there were Lamanites and Nephites. He states that “it came to pass that
we lived after the manner of happiness” (2 Nephi 5:27). This passage is
alluded to at least three times. A later prophet named Nephi engages
in nostalgia for that earlier time: “Oh, that I could have had my days
in the days when my father ﬁrst came out of the land of Jerusalem,
that I could have joyed with him in the promised land; then were his
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people easy to be entreated, ﬁrm to keep the commandments of God,
and slow to be led to iniquity” (Helaman 7:7). That level is surpassed
later in the Book of Mormon during a time when there was no contention, lying, murder, adultery, nor revisionists: “and surely there could
not be a happier people among all the people who had been created by
the hand of God. There were no robbers, nor murderers, neither were
there Lamanites, nor any manner of -ites” (4 Nephi 1:16–17). Similarly, during Moroni’s day, the passage explicitly quotes the promises
made to the fathers: “they shall be blessed, inasmuch as they shall keep
my commandments they shall prosper in the land. But remember, inasmuch as they will not keep my commandments they shall be cut oﬀ
from the presence of the Lord” (Alma 50:20). Intervening verses note
that the promise has been veriﬁed. Then the narrator notes, “behold
there never was a happier time among the people of Nephi, since the
days of Nephi, than in the days of Moroni” (Alma 50:23).
Similarly, when a group of Nephites severs their connection to
the Nephite tradition by marking their foreheads (Alma 3:4), this reminds the narrator (Mormon) of how the Lamanites were ﬁrst marked
oﬀ from the Nephites (Alma 3:6-9). For Mormon, this marking is not
a matter of race or descent but of adherence to diﬀerent traditions
(Alma 3:11). Mormon then explicitly refers to 2 Nephi 5:
Thus the word of God is fulﬁlled, for these are the words
which he said to Nephi: Behold, the Lamanites have I cursed,
and I will set a mark on them that they and their seed may be
separated from thee and thy seed, from this time henceforth
and forever, except they repent of their wickedness and turn
to me that I may have mercy upon them. And again: I will set
a mark upon him that mingleth his seed with thy brethren,
that they may be cursed also. And again: I will set a mark
upon him that ﬁghteth against thee and thy seed. And again,
I say he that departeth from thee shall no more be called thy
seed; and I will bless thee, and whomsoever shall be called thy
seed, henceforth and forever; and these were the promises of
the Lord unto Nephi and to his seed. (Alma 3:14-17)
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The passage Mormon cites is 2 Nephi 5:21-24, but notice that the
wording in that passage diﬀers considerably from Mormon’s though
the source text is apparent:
And he had caused the cursing to come upon them, yea,
even a sore cursing, because of their iniquity. For behold, they
had hardened their hearts against him, that they had become
like unto a ﬂint; wherefore, as they were white, and exceedingly fair and delightsome, that they might not be enticing
unto my people the Lord did cause a skin of blackness to come
upon them. And thus saith the Lord God: I will cause that
they shall be loathsome unto thy people, save they shall repent
of their iniquities. And cursed shall be the seed of him that
mixeth with their seed; for they shall be cursed even with the
same cursing. And the Lord spake it, and it was done. (2 Nephi 5:21-23)
This is very speciﬁc information that Mormon knows about Nephi’s
narrative and writings. If the Alma passage were written prior to the
2 Nephi passage, then Joseph Smith not only would have had to remember to pen the Nephi text without being able to refer back to the
other passage but would also have had to build the speciﬁc reference
to Nephi as the original source long before Nephi became the original
source. All of this Joseph Smith would have to do without being able
to refer to notes³⁹ while composing at a rate of thirty-ﬁve hundred
words a day.⁴⁰
Richard Rust has pointed out that we have yet much work ahead
of us before we begin to appreciate how often the Book of Mormon
alludes to itself. None of this work has been done by revisionists because they have no ideological interest in doing so; they, in fact, have
an ideological interest in making the textual elements in the scripture
as simple as their own reading of it. Rust points to one passage from
3 Nephi that refers to one of the ﬁrst chapters in the Book of Mormon:
39. Terryl L. Givens, By the Hand of Mormon: The American Scripture That Launched
a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32.
40. Ibid., 37.
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the church was eclipsed by the wickedness of the people “in all the
land save it were among a few of the Lamanites who were converted
unto the true faith; and they would not depart from it, for they were
ﬁrm, and steadfast, and immovable, willing with all diligence to keep
the commandments of the Lord” (3 Nephi 6:14). This passage fulﬁlls
Lehi’s oldest yearning for his son Lemuel, who is promised in the valley named after him that if he would be “like unto this valley, ﬁrm and
steadfast, and immovable in keeping the commandments of the Lord,”
he would be blessed (1 Nephi 2:10).⁴¹ Rust doesn’t note another passage that alludes to this same material. Like the passage from 3 Nephi,
Helaman 15 comments on the Lamanites who were more righteous
than their contemporary Nephite brethren (it is, after all, Samuel the
Lamanite speaking). The prophet then cites the Lamanites as an example to the Nephites for “as many as have come to this, ye know of
yourselves are ﬁrm and steadfast in the faith, and the thing wherewith
they have been made free” (Helaman 15:8). The textual elements that
include allusion are too complex for revisionist readers to even mention or notice. The possibility of complex intertextual relationships is
opened up (made possible) by the believer’s ideological commitment
to ﬁnding a rich and rewarding text; the same possibility is foreclosed
by the revisionist’s commitment to any old ad hoc explanation that
will do the ideological work of dismissing the Book of Mormon as an
ancient text.
I have mentioned only a few allusions to show the diﬃculties faced
by Mosiah-ﬁrst revisionists. The examples given are suﬃcient to raise
an issue: if you propose a theory of textual development that has such
counterintuitive results as to require a writer to allude to a passage
before he has even composed that passage, more convincing evidence
is called for than has been produced so far. The evidence ought to rely
less on the ideological assumptions that there were no gold plates and
that Joseph Smith composed a modern novel.
41. Richard Dilworth Rust, “Ancient Literary Forms in the Book of Mormon,”
FARMS Review of Books 14/1–2 (2002): 89.
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Concluding Unscientiﬁc Postscript
Firmage notes in a brief autobiographical section of his essay how
he came to believe no longer in the Book of Mormon and the church
(see p. 13). This narrative form is common enough among Mormon
intellectuals who have left orthodox belief that we ought to call it
the conversion-to-modernity type-scene. “I have often thought that
what happened to me in Berkeley was fundamentally a conversion or,
if you like, an anti-conversion” (p. 2). Conversion is the right word,
for not only did Firmage shift from believing the restored gospel, he
adopted another form of religious belief—in modernity. For the sake
of convenience, I call this religion the Church of Humanity, named
after the positivistic church founded by Auguste Comte as a substitute
for Christianity. Modernity is like a religion; it is an encompassing
worldview that restructures the believer’s frame of reference; it has
its own ordinances and community (symposia instead of church attendance, sacramental publications rather than bread and water, testimonial panels at MHA meetings instead of church meetings, doctrines such as materialism rather than the atonement, and heretics
who are college-educated yet still believers in Mormon claims). It also
has a built-in logic of exclusion that from the outset declares competing faiths deﬁcient; it claims to be the one-and-only true way to
truth. Most importantly, it also requires a leap of faith, too often a
leap that its adherents take uncritically. The version of modernity that
has dominated intellectual culture over the past century is positivism. Positivism by its very deﬁnition denies validity to religious belief,
restricting religion to the infancy of human development. Positivism
privileges its positions over religion in ways that we now recognize
as illegitimate. Positivism is not what it claims for itself, though its
acolytes do not consider the possibility that postmodern thought has
undermined its central claims.
So while the editors of American Apocrypha, most of its contributors, and the editorial leadership at Signature Books are positivists
who misunderstand the nature of historical writing, it does little good
for people like me to sit at the last-stop gas station as the Signature
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stable of writers drive on up the road. I have been saying for more than
a decade as they fuel up, “You know, that road you are on is a dead
end that leads directly into the base of a cliﬀ in a blind canyon; if you
won’t try another road, at least buckle up and drive slowly around that
last bend.” They then gun their engines and peel out of the gas station.
Positivist historiography has exhausted itself and the New Mormon
History will have to be reconﬁgured without positivism as its foundation. The shift will bring with it wrenching adjustments, but it cannot
be avoided for the diﬃculty it requires.
The movie Monty Python and the Holy Grail is set in medieval
England, ad 932. Part of the humor is supplied by the bevy of anachronisms. One of my favorites occurs at the beginning of the ﬁlm when
King Arthur rides up to a castle and asks two peasants to whom the
castle belongs. The peasants take umbrage at the claim that he is their
king or that they must have a lord, for they assert they live in a state of
anarchy with a rotating executive selected weekly. The exchange rings
with abundant Marxist language of domination, oppression, and a
“self-perpetuating aristocracy” that takes advantage of the working
class. Asked for the source of his own claim to be king, Arthur tells
the tale of the Lady of the Lake and Excalibur. One peasant responds
to this narrative with derision because for him “supreme executive
power derives from a mandate from the masses, not from some farcical aquatic ceremony.” To hear the peasant asserting these ideas
that weren’t minted until the modern period is to see the timeframe
get jumbled. Brent Metcalfe, Susan Staker, and Edwin Firmage have
a similar problem to overcome in their assertion that Joseph Smith
wrote a novel that started with King Benjamin’s speech; just as the
peasant cites Marxists long before there were any, these revisionists
have the Book of Mormon presenting complex and multiple passages
long before they were written. If only their ideologically inspired narrative were as humorous, the new crop of Mormon ﬁlm directors
would soon be taking a movie into production about the pursuit of
the positivist grail.

